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Recent developments in climate regulation have led corporations to adjust their business models to 
prepare for the transition to a low-carbon economy. To respond to existing legislation and hedge against 
future climate regulations risk, an increasing number of mainly large corporations voluntarily embed an 
internal carbon value in decision-making processes as part of their business strategy. The aim of this study 
is to investigate the main forces that drive the adoption of such practice. A sample of 261 firms 
participating in the Carbon Disclosure Project is used to test a framework based on stakeholder theory 
and the resource-based view. The binary logistic regression analysis provides empirical evidence for the 
positive effect of institutional and stakeholder pressure on internal carbon pricing adoption. This paper 
finds that large corporations that employ a sustainability committee and rely on carbon-intense operations 
are more likely to adopt it. The results of this research should be of interest to policymakers, executive 
directors and external stakeholders engaged in climate change mitigation and adaptation policies.  
 








Climate change entails severe risks to mankind, from threatened food supply due to extreme periods of 
drought and shifting rain patterns to higher frequencies of catastrophic flooding caused by shrinking ice 
sheets and rising sea levels (IPCC, 2014). Strong evidence exists that this phenomenon is largely caused 
by anthropogenic activities: Economic and population growth as well as ever-intensifying 
industrialization have driven up the level of carbon dioxide and other human-made emissions in the 
atmosphere, leading to the greenhouse gas (GHG) effect and substantially contributing to change the 
global climatic system (Stern, 2007). To combat these severe and irreversible consequences for 
humankind and the natural ecosystems, urgent action in permanently reducing human-made GHG 
emissions is required. Effective decision-making would not only mitigate the risks associated with 
climatic change in this century and beyond but also scale down the entire costs of adaptation in the long-
term and establish a basis for climate-friendly and sustainable development (IPCC, 2014).  
Consequently, governments and policy makers worldwide have placed climate change on their agenda 
and prioritize the goal of the transition to a low carbon economy. In 2015, nearly 200 countries signed the 
Paris Agreement and committed to combat global warming and its impacts, striving to limit global 
temperature increase below two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by 2100 (UN, 2015). Hence, 
different types of intervention have been proposed by policy makers, such as carbon taxation, emission 
trading schemes or subsidies to promote eco-efficient innovations and technologies (Stern, 2007). 
Environmental awareness moving into the focus of society additionally strengthens the pressure from 
other stakeholders like non-governmental organizations, customers or shareholders to reduce their carbon 
footprint and operate environmentally consciously (Jeswani et al., 2008). Whilst engaging in socio-
political discussions and influencing policy-makers towards more favorable solutions in the past, the 
majority of businesses have accepted the challenge of a carbon-constrained economy in the near future 




development and capitalize on the market opportunities and potentials that open up due to shifting 
interests from customers and institutional bodies (Weinhofer and Busch, 2013).  
One corporate instrument that is steadily gaining higher popularity among business leaders is internal 
carbon pricing (ICP). Companies embed an internal value on their carbon emissions into their business 
strategy to stress-test their operations and investments, assess and manage hidden inefficiencies, climate 
risks and opportunities, anticipate more intense and far-reaching carbon regulations and foster the 
transition towards a low-carbon business model (Bartlett, 2017). Having emerged as a powerful and cost-
effective risk management approach, empirical research exploring key determinants of ICP adoption is 
still very scarce. This paper pursues contributes to fill this gap by analyzing (i) the impact of stakeholders  ́
and institutional pressure as well as (ii) the influence of organizational capabilities and a firm´s carbon 
footprint on ICP implementation leading to the following research question: 
What are the main factors that determine the business decision to implement internal carbon pricing 
initiatives?  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: The next section summarizes prior economic 
research on corporate climate change adaptation. In section 3, we present our analytical framework and 
develop testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents information about the sample, the data collection process 
and the measurement of the employed variables, followed by a description of the statistical methodology 
in section 5. Furthermore, the main empirical results are illustrated and their validity checked by running 
various robustness tests. Finally, the last section offers conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review  
Although natural science has been addressing climate change and its respective risks for decades, its 
mitigation is a rather recent issue receiving increasing attention within today´s corporate world 




impacts on corporations in various dimensions. These risks might affect companies both directly and 
indirectly and include physical, regulatory, financial and legal liability risks as well as reputational 
patterns (Lash and Wellington, 2007). Consequently, firms need to handle and manage the negative 
impacts on their operations more thoroughly than ever before (Winn et al., 2011).1 
Prior research on corporate climate change management mainly addressed voluntary carbon 
disclosure, its drivers and outcomes (e.g. Stanny, 2013; Griffin et al. 2017), as well as the effect of 
corporate carbon emissions on financial outcomes and enterprise value (e.g. Giannarakis et al., 2017). 
Various authors have already proposed several climate change risk mitigation measures at the firm-level, 
including the participation in political activities, trading emission certificates and operational 
improvements (e.g. Kolk and Pinkse, 2007; Weihnhofer and Busch, 2013). However, little research 
addressed the characteristics of corporate carbon management activities, directly targeting emission 
reductions and their determinants.   
This paper is most closely related to Yunus et al. (2015) who researched the relationship between the 
introduction of a carbon management strategy and internal organizational as well as corporate governance 
factors among Australia´s 200 largest companies. The results of the logistic regression analysis revealed 
a significant correlation with the presence of an environmental management system, an environmental 
committee as well as larger board size and board independence. We have also taken into account the 
findings of Luo and Tang (2016), who investigated the factors that affect the quality of corporate carbon 
management systems among companies that voluntarily participated in the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP). By running an ordinary least squares regression, the firm´s regulatory and legal environment, the 
presence of an emission trading scheme (ETS), stronger pressure from competitors, as well as higher 
carbon exposure showed a positive correlation with higher quality of carbon management systems. In 
                                                      
1 There is also a literature on the unintended consequences of climate change, known as the Green Paradox, that 




contrast, Böttcher and Müller (2015) focused their study more specifically on the dynamics within the 
German automotive supplier sector. They estimated a structural equation model to conclude that 
stakeholder pressure and to some extent competitiveness expectations are driving the development of 
low-carbon products, productions and logistics. Damert et al. (2017) reaffirmed the relevance of 
institutional and stakeholder pressure as key determinants of emission reduction activities whilst focusing 
on 45 leading companies from the steel, automotive and cement sectors. However, no direct relationship 
between corporate carbon strategies and long-term improvements in carbon and financial performance 
was found.  
Our study, instead, explicitly analyzes the key drivers of ICP adoption. We contribute to the literature 
by establishing a framework that combines stakeholder and institutional theory with the resource-based 
view, namely corporate organization and structural factors. Assessing how external pressure from various 
stakeholders, internal factors as well as the firm´s carbon intensity might influence ICP implementation 
will be valuable for both stakeholders and policy makers.   
 
3. Analytical Framework 
In this section, we describe the main hypotheses to be tested regarding the decision to adopt ICP. We 
distinguish between external and internal factors. 
 
3.1 Theoretical Background 
Freeman´s (1984) pioneering book about stakeholder theory argued that satisfying all stakeholders and 
not only direct stockholders and customers is essential for organizational success in the long term. 
(Mitchell et al., 1997). Due to the rising general interest about GHG mitigation, firms are pressured to 
react to their stakeholder´s claims by managing environmental topics and implementing appropriate 
policies. Especially the regulatory environment is very influential in shaping internal strategies and 




industry, and hence being the target of a common regulatory environment, face similar levels and sources 
of institutional pressure and will therefore follow similar internal approaches, known as “coercive 
isomorphism” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1993). 
Additionally, internal characteristics seem to play a crucial role in taking climate action and initiating 
environmental policies. The resource-based view argues that a firm´s internal structure as well as its 
resources and capabilities are pivotal in meeting emerging challenges and uniquely determine stakeholder 
relations (Barney, 1986). Especially when practices like ICP schemes are relatively novel and recent, 
organizational characteristics might be decisive as benefits and costs of implementing such a measure are 
not yet clear (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). 
 
3.2 Hypotheses Development 
In this section, we present the seven hypotheses to be tested. Hypotheses 1 to 3 focus on external factors 
related to the claims of stakeholder theory while hypotheses 4 to 7 test the influence of internal factors. 
 
H1: Firms operating in countries with severe climate regulation and legislation are more likely to 
implement internal carbon pricing mechanisms.  
Prior literature has shown that increasing compliance costs incurred by climate regulation and legislation 
as well as growing liability for their carbon footprint are the major drivers for companies to actively 
manage and reduce their emission levels (e.g. Luo and Tang, 2014; Böttcher and Müller, 2015; Damert 
et al., 2017). As slowly but surely the vision of worldwide carbon pricing begins to seem more likely, the 
momentum of tightening future climate regulations to achieve the national targets of the Paris Agreement 
is arriving. To hedge against these compliance risks, corporations adjust by setting emission reduction 
targets in the present, thus anticipating those regulations (Pinkse, 2007; Damert et al., 2017). Voluntarily 
adopting an internal carbon value hence offers the opportunity to ensure regulatory compliance with 




H2: Firms with a higher ratio of financial leverage are more likely to implement internal carbon 
pricing mechanisms.  
Due to closer scrutiny by regulatory bodies in recent years, also creditors are requiring greater 
transparency from their borrowers on their carbon footprint. Generally, financial institutions provide loans 
for major purchases or projects. In return, they expect the borrowing firm to pay back the loan consistently 
and responsibly. Therefore, creditors might be very sensitive towards financial risks which can be 
potentially caused by climate-related regulations and carbon-intense operations. Especially in highly 
regulated countries where carbon regulations are in practice, they incorporate potential non-compliance 
within their lending risk assessment, resulting in stricter requirements and additional fees for affected 
firms (Schneider, 2011).  Consequently, their influence on the borrowing firm´s operations increases with 
the extent of corporate financial debt (Artiach et al., 2009). Previous studies have already found evidence 
of a positive relationship between higher financial gearing and both the degree of environmental 
disclosures (Alciatore and Dee, 2006) and the adoption of carbon management tools (Yunus et al, 2015). 
 
H3: Firms facing greater societal pressure and awareness about climate change are more likely to 
implement internal carbon pricing mechanisms.1 
Due to large media attention and consequently, rising societal interest by non-governmental 
organizations, customers and the civil society (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006), firms are urged to embed 
environmental compliance within their business strategy (Weinhofer and Hoffmann, 2010; Yunus et al., 
2015). To close an impending legitimacy gap, maintain their reputation and ensure long-term 
competitiveness, companies have not only disclosed their carbon emissions in the past but also started 
various initiatives proactively like improving the environmental performance within their processes 
                                                      
1 One might assume that societal pressure could influence regulation intensity and hence, should be employed as a 
mediator variable in this model. However, the Spearman correlation matrix in the Annex presents a slightly negative 
but significant coefficient. Therefore, it can be inferred that a mediating effect is not present. In addition, we tested for 




(Sangle, 2011), developing green product lines, participating in political lobbying and launching public 
relations campaigns (Lee, 2012; Damert et al., 2017). In addition, public organizations like the CDP 
(Carbon Disclose Project), the I4CE (Intstitute for Climate Economics) or the epe (enterprises pour 
l ́environnement) are increasingly spreading awareness about ICP as a long-term climate change 
mitigation strategy and hence, intensifying societal pressure.  
 
H4: Firms with an environmental committee are more likely to implement internal carbon 
pricing mechanisms than those without. 
Prior studies additionally considered internal organization and corporate governance factors as crucial 
determinants of carbon management adoption and quality (e.g. Yunus et al., 2015).  
One way to show strong commitment towards environmental sustainability is the constitution of an 
environmental committee composed most commonly by independent experts. They are responsible for 
steering corporate social responsibility activities and undertaking environmental initiatives with 
transparency and credibility (Eccles et al., 2012) whilst aiming at ensuring legitimacy and minimizing 
reputational risk within the corporate organization (Yunus et al., 2015). Thus, such a committee offers 
guidance in reporting on GHG emissions and introducing carbon reduction initiatives to increase the value 
of the firm (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).  
 
H5: Firms with a higher number of board members are more likely to implement internal carbon 
pricing mechanisms.  
Yunus et al. (2015) have shown the relevance of the internal board structure for successful corporate 
governance. These practices of effective and diligent management are generally carried out by the board 
of directors. The board´s members are respectively also held liable for the consequences of the firm´s 
sustainability and environmental performance (Kiel & Nicholson, 2005). A number of studies argue that 




Adams and Mehran, 2008) which respectively improves the firm´s governance and particularly adds 
value in developing climate-related strategies (Rankin et al., 2011).  
 
H6: Firms with a higher share of independent directors are more likely to implement internal 
carbon pricing mechanisms. 
In addition, board´s composition needs to be considered when examining the impact on corporate 
governance success. One crucial characteristic is the share of board members that act independently, 
referred to as independent directors, which has been addressed in numerous studies (e.g., Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Independent directors deliver great value to the company 
by scrutinizing managerial actions and corporate strategy development whilst holding the management 
responsible for their decisions. Being independent from the executive board and hence being hardly 
driven by economic self-interest, they operate as the trustees of the shareholders, ensure corporate 
compliance and achieve the right balance between financial, social and ecological interests (Morck, 
2008). Therefore, board independence not only fosters monitoring and disclosure processes (Peasnell et 
al., 2005) but also addresses non-economic questions like the current climate change debate in favor of 
external stakeholders (Galbreath, 2010; Yunus et al., 2015). As ICP can indeed be considered as a 
corporate environmental initiative, facilitated by social concerns, board independence might provide 
guidance and facilitate its implementation.  
 
H7: Firms with higher carbon intensity within their operations are more likely to implement 
internal carbon pricing mechanisms. 
Especially high emitting companies and industries are the main target of the general public, environmental 
lobby groups (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Luo and Tang, 2014), and 
regulatory authorities (Patten, 2002) within the scope of today´s discussion about climate change 




et al., 2002; Reverte, 2009). As the risk of making stranded investments is greatest for firms with high 
carbon exposure, the benefits of actively managing their environmental operations grow with total 
greenhouse gas emissions (Anton et al., 2004). Thus, it is very likely that heavy emitters strive to 
anticipate mandatory environmental regulations and mitigate climate risk proactively by implementing 
ICP systems (Luo and Tang, 2016).  
 
4. Data  
4.1 Sample Description 
This study relies on the data from the largest 500 corporations worldwide, measured by total revenue, 
which are represented by the Fortune Global 500 ranking 2017. This index has been chosen for two 
reasons. Firstly, society, environmental groups, media and governments pay greatest attention to 
especially large and highly polluting companies, pressure them to disclose more information publicly and 
to show commitment to sustainable operations (Eleftheriadis and Anagnostopoulou, 2015). Secondly, 
larger firms tend to be in a better position with respect to developing environmental strategies than smaller 
peers as they can ensure a desired market environment more easily and have greater financial and human 
resources to implement these initiatives (Bansal, 2005; Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Weinhofer and 
Hoffmann, 2010). The data used in this study were collected from the CDP questionnaire and 
complemented with publicly available datasets like annual, sustainability and corporate citizenship 
reports, economic classifications, acknowledged surveys and online databank services for financial 
information. We eliminated the corporations with incomplete datasets and end up with 261 firms that 
fully fulfill the sampling requirements. Exactly a third of these companies are located in the U.S. The 
majority of the remaining firms are either Asian or Western European. Whilst 60 financial institutions are 
included, 46 firms operate in industries which are classified as environmental-sensitive, namely Energy, 




4.2 Description of the variables 
4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
As this study aims to understand whether a corporation implemented an ICP mechanism or not, the 
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable (ICP) is used that equals “1” if the firm has adopted such a 
scheme and “0” otherwise. Within the CDP survey from 2017, firms have been asked if they are already 
putting a price on carbon, are planning to do so within the following two years or not considering it at all. 
However, the second option is not binding and highly speculative. Hence, the answer had been restricted 
to the current state and information was collected manually from the corporate responses. Additionally, 
companies can voluntarily disclose information on how they calculate the value they employ per ton of 
emitted carbon dioxide equivalents and to which projects, operations and divisions they apply it. Since 
responses to these questions are largely not available or inconsistent and less comparable, the information 
was considered not suitable for this research.  
 
Table 1: Description of the employed variables   
Variable Measurement  Hypothesis 
Dependent    
ICP 1 if a firm adopted ICP and 0 otherwise    
Explanatory    
RegPress The CLIM-Index score for the headquarters’ home country (Scale: 0-100)  H1 (+) 
CredPress Ratio of corporate long-term debt to total assets (in %)  H2 (+) 
SocPress Share of inhabitants that have knowledge about climate change in the home country (in %)  H3 (+) 
EnvCom 1 if a firm employs an environmental committee and 0 otherwise   H4 (+) 
BSize Total number of directors on the board   H5 (+) 
BInd Share of independent directors on the board (in %)  H6 (+) 
CarInt Natural logarithm of total Scope 1 and 2 emissions (in metric tons) scaled by total sales (in 
million USD) 
 H7 (+) 
Control    
FSize The natural logarithm of total assets (in million USD)   
RoA Ratio of net earnings to average assets (in %)   
ANS Adjusted net savings divided by gross national income (in %)   




4.2.2 Independent Variables: External Factors 
To capture the impact of institutional, legislative and regulatory pressure (RegPress) on corporate 
environmental strategies, we used the CLIM (Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures) Index by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, scaled from 0 to 100. This index is globally 
comparable, measuring extensiveness of climate change mitigation policies by evaluating policy 
measures, anchored laws and institutions at the country level (EBRD, 2011). In accordance with the 
“Country-of-Origin Effect” (Levy and Kolk, 2002), the corporate headquarters’ location is pivotal for the 
individual score of the analyzed firm. Pressure executed from creditors (CredPress) is described by the 
ratio of financial leverage which is computed as long-term debt scaled by total assets. Highly leveraged 
firms tend to be more intensively monitored and influenced by credit grantors and financial institutions 
(Cormier et al., 2015). To describe societal pressure (SocPress) on corporate environmental performance, 
the Gallup poll from 2009 is used. This survey on the public opinion about climate change is considered 
to be one of the most comprehensive surveys in this field. 206,193 respondents from 128 countries were 
asked about their awareness and knowledge about climate change, whether they experience it as a 
personal threat and whether they view it as caused by natural or anthropogenic activities (Pugliese and 
Ray, 2009). Consequently, public awareness in the headquarters’ country is taken as a proxy for societal 
pressure whilst controlling for the emancipation of the population.  
 
4.2.3 Independent Variables: Internal Factors 
Two different approaches are used to measure the organizational variables. The presence of an 
environmental committee (EnvCom) is described by a dichotomous variable that uses the value “1” if the 
analyzed firm has established a committee that explicitly deals with corporate social responsibility, 
environmental concerns or sustainability issues and “0” if not (Rankin et al., 2011). Board size (BSize) as 
a pivotal characteristic of corporate governance is measured by the number of directors on the corporate 




independent directors on the board (Yunus et al, 2015). Information about organizational factors is gained 
from annual reports, corporate websites and Bloomberg.  
Carbon intensity (CarInt) is described as the natural logarithm of total Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions1 
in relation to total sales (in million US-Dollars) which is in line with prior approaches (e.g. Anton et al., 
2004; Luo and Tang, 2016). Data on corporate emission levels has been found in the companies  ́CDP 
survey responses and compared with information from sustainability reports and Bloomberg.  
 
4.2.4 Control Variables 
Although our study focuses on the influence of stakeholder theory and internal resources, we need to 
control for other factors that might affect the empirical results of our analysis. Thus, firm size, a financial 
profitability indicator, the home country’s adjusted net savings and the political emancipation of their 
inhabitants were added as control variables to the proposed model.  
As earlier explained, larger firms are scrutinized more intensely by various stakeholders (Bansal, 
2005) and consequently are incentivized to engage in social and environmental initiatives (Anton et al., 
2014). These hypotheses are confirmed by prior research which confirmed a positive relationship between 
company size and both voluntary carbon disclosure (e.g. Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Luo and Tang, 
2014) and the implementation of climate change mitigation strategies (e.g. González-Benito and 
González-Benito, 2006; Weinhofer and Hoffmann, 2010; Damert and Baumgartner, 2017). Hence, firm 
size (FSize) is used as a control variable, expressed by the natural logarithm of total assets in million US-
Dollars (Stanny, 2013; Luo and Tang, 2014).  
Not only the size of the company but also its financial health will increase public pressure and societal 
demands to ensure sustainable operations and disclose corporate social activities (Gamerschlag et al., 
                                                      
1 Scope 1 emissions measure direct GHG emissions from sources and operations that are owned or controlled by the 
analyzed company while Scope 2 emissions cover indirect GHG emissions from the generation of consumed 




2011). Additionally, the resource dependence theory argues that more profitable companies have greater 
resources to implement advanced and costly environmental management tools (Hillary, 2004). 
Consequently, larger and more successful companies are expected to engage more actively in carbon 
management activities. As proposed in previous studies, Return on Assets (RoA) operates as a proxy for 
financial performance (e.g. Bansal, 2005; Damert et al., 2017).   
To account for the economic performance of the home country, gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita was commonly used in prior studies (e.g. Luo and Tang, 2014) as countries with a smaller GDP 
may not have the financial capabilities to sacrifice economic growth for climate protection measures. 
However, a country´s GDP does not incorporate information about depletion of its stock of natural capital. 
Therefore, adjusted net savings (ANS) will be employed as a macroeconomic control variable in the 
proposed model. It extends the net national savings measure by adding public expenditures on education 
as a proxy for investment in human capital whilst deducting depreciation of the environment (e.g. 
damages from local pollutants) and depletion of natural resources like energy, minerals or forests, and, 
thus, standing as the leading economic indicator of (weak) sustainability for an economy (Heal, 2012).  
Lastly, to account for the emancipation of the population, the democracy index (Democ), developed 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit, is used. This indicator incorporates, among others, political 
participation, democratic political culture and civil liberties (EIU, 2017). As the responses from the latest 
CDP survey are based on information from 2016, all other data refer to this fiscal year as well. Only 
RegPress and SocPress rely on measurements from 2011 and 2009 respectively. Therefore, we assume 
stability on those indicators for the period under analysis. 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Nearly a third of the 261 reported companies have already adopted some kind of ICP mechanisms. 




102 firms (39 percent) employ an environmental committee to manage environmental and climate-related 
issues. The CLIM-Index (RegPress) shows a mean of 53.9 on a scale from 0 to 100. While Russia 
indicates the lowest value (13.4), the CLIM-score is also very low for the USA (34.0). Information on the  
remaining variables can be found in Table 2. 
 
5. Empirical Methodology  
As ICP adoption is a dichotomous variable, a binary logistic regression is employed which shows 
statistically a higher fit than the probit model.1 
The proposed model to be estimated can be stated as follows:  (1) 𝐼𝐶𝑃 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1RegPress + 𝛽2CredPress + 𝛽3SocPress + 𝛽4EnvCom + 𝛽5BSize + 𝛽6BInd + 𝛽7CarInt + 𝛽8FSize + 𝛽9RoA + 𝛽10ANS + 𝛽11Democ + 𝜀, 
                                                      
1 Both models are applicable when attempting to model a binary dependent variable and usually lead to very similar 
results. The major difference lies in the assumption on the distribution of error terms in the model. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Frequency  Percentage   
ICP 
   Yes 









   Yes 








Variables Mean SD Min Max Median 
RegPress 53.94 18.70 13.40 80.10 62.90 
CredPress 6.91 7.59 1.11 64.77 3.80 
SocPress 93.08 9.53 35 99 97 
BSize 12.59 3.42 4 23 12 
BInd 67.27 23.77 0 100 72.73 
CarInt 3.34 2.12 -2.57 8.33 3.34 
FSize 11.55 1.28 8.913 15.06 11.28 
RoA 3.89 4.45 -13.91 20.53 3.01 
ANS 9.90 5.70 3.90 35.60 7.40 
Democ 7.89 1.19 3.14 9.93 7.98 




where 𝛽0 represents the intercept and 𝛽1 to 𝛽7 the coefficients of the independent variables while 𝛽8 to 𝛽11 represent the coefficients of the control variables. We expect positive signs for the estimates of 𝛽1 to 𝛽7. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
In this section, the empirical results from (1) are presented and discussed. Thereafter, we acknowledge 
some limitations of this study and provide recommendations for future research.  
 
6.1 Main findings and discussion 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the binary logistic regression model1 and reports the average marginal 
effects for each variable.2 Whilst Model 1 only includes control variables, Model 2 further adds the three 
external pressure variables. Model 3 contains all aforementioned variables and adds another four internal 
factors. The likelihood ratio chi-square value of 12.84 in Model 1 is significant at the 5 percent level, 
indicating that only the control variables can already make a significant distinction between companies 
that adopt internal carbon pricing schemes and those which do not. When adding additional variables, the 
Pseudo-R2 increases continuously. The largest Pseudo-R2 is obtained in Model 3 with a value 0.25 which 
means that 25 percent of the variations in adopting ICP schemes or not can be explained by this model. 
Especially, introducing carbon intensity (CarInt) into the model adds value. Overall, the binary logistic 
regression model classifies 75.9 percent of the firms correctly. 
                                                      
1 We tested for multicollinearity and could not find indication for severe problems. Additionally, the Spearman correlation 
matrix does not show unusual high coefficients among the explanatory variables. The respective tables can be found in the 
Annex. 
 






From Model 3 we observe that regulatory pressure (RegPress) is statistically significant, providing 
evidence that supports H1, according to which firms located in countries with severe climate regulations 
and legislation are more likely to adopt ICP schemes. This is in line with prior research in this field (e.g. 
Jeswani et al., 2008), and supports the claims of institutional theory. Corporate action is shaped by its 
legal and institutional framework. The coefficients of CredPress and SocPress are both not significant. 
Thus, H2 and H3 are not supported. The positive sign of EnvCom supports H4 at the 95 percent level, 
indicating that the presence of a corporate environmental committee might encourage the implementation 
of ICP within a company. The expertise within such a committee, combined with the responsibility to 
Table 3: Summarized results of binary logistic regression analysis 










































































  0.091*** 
(0.000)* * 






Pseudo R2 0.0391* * 0.0931* * 0.2467* * 
Correctly classified 68.58 %.  68.58 %. 75.86 %.     
Notes: Average Marginal Effects reported  
N = 261 all models 




ensure sustainable development, effectively provides support to proactively initiating environmental 
activities, following the claims of the resource based view. 
 The organizational factors Board Size (BSize) and the share of independent directors on the board 
(BInd) are not significant, suggesting that corporate governance does not play a decisive role in 
determining the adoption of ICP. Additionally, the positive and highly significant coefficient of CarInt 
indicates that firms operating very carbon intensively tend to adopt ICP schemes. Finally, the positive and 
significant sign for firm size (FSize) confirms the findings of prior studies that larger firms are more likely 
to introduce actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and disclose more accurate information on their 
environmental exposure to maintain corporate legitimacy (e.g. Weinhofer and Hoffmann, 2010; Damert 
and Baumgartner, 2017). The remaining control variables RoA, ANS and Democ are not significant.  
 
6.2 Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of the results alternative proxies were used to measure carbon intensity (CarInt), 
firm size (FSize) and the macroeconomic conditions in the headquarters  ́home country in Model 4. As 
climate regulation and legislation target rather industries rather than individual highly-polluting 
companies, a categorization of carbon intensity across different sectors has been carried out. Reverte 
(2009) classifies the Energy, Utilities and Materials sectors as environmentally sensitive due to their 
carbon-intensive business model. Thus, we introduce a dummy variable (EnvSens) that equals 1 if a firm 
operates in one of these three industries and 0 otherwise. Additionally, as in prior studies, firm size 
(FSizeRev) can also be measured as the natural logarithm of total revenue (e.g. Yunus et al., 2015; Luo & 
Tang, 2016, Giannarakis et al., 2017). As proposed by Luo & Tang (2016), the natural logarithm of GDP 
per capita (GDP) will be used as a proxy for the current economic conditions within the corporate home 
countries. Finally, Luo and Tang (2016) argue that financial institutions should be excluded in cross-




emission-free operations. As financial firms and institutions play a significant role within the sample, they 
have been removed in model 5. 
Generally, the results (reported in the Annex) are qualitatively consistent and therefore similar 
conclusions can be drawn from all models. Only in Model 4, when applying alternative proxies in the 
binary logistic regression model, SocPress becomes significant with a positive sign. This highlights the 
relevance of societal pressure in this study and further supports stakeholder theory. Additionally, the 
empirical findings are consistent with the claim of legitimacy theory. Awareness about climate change 
within society, promoted by intensive media coverage, environmental activism and education sets 
boundaries and expectations towards corporate social and environmental behavior. Firms may respond 
to these public norms by implementing voluntary ICP schemes to comply with new societal expectations 
and to remain legitimate to this large and important stakeholder group (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). We 
also found that companies from environmentally sensitive sectors are more likely to adopt internal carbon 
pricing. As the specific characteristics of stakeholders  ́pressure vary highly among countries, industries 
and firms, the large divergences of corporate environmental management can be explained by variations 
in national factors like regulation or legislation (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006). As both regulatory 
environment and societal pressure are measured at a home-country specific level the headquarters´ 
geographical locations are relevant in this context as well, consistent with previous studies (e.g. Gonzalez-
Benito and Gonzalez-Benito, 2006). 
In contrast, CredPress shows a negative and significant marginal effect in Model 5 whilst being not 
significant in the original model. This suggests that highly leveraged companies from non-financial 
industries are less likely to adopt ICP schemes. In general, creditors aim to ensure liquidity of the 
borrowing firm to preserve their rights and interests. Although ICP schemes primarily aim at mitigating 
financial risks caused by anticipation of tightening of future climate regulations and, therefore 




considerable implementation and ongoing costs associated with research and development, monitoring 
and additional labor force (Luo and Tang, 2016). In the short run, such an investment might negatively 
affect the firm´s payment risk. However, highly leveraged companies might not have the financial leeway 
to bear these costs. Moreover, ICP is a very recent carbon management tool and, hence, little evidence 
exists about how effective it is in achieving emission reduction targets. Eventually, its benefits might not 
be enough to offset the high implementation and operating costs even in the long run. Therefore, creditors 
might require the borrowing companies to rather adopt more acknowledged and renowned environmental 
management actions. Overall, the Pseudo-R2 increases significantly to 0.31 in Model 5, supporting Luo 
and Tang´s (2016) claim that excluding the financial sector might lead to more meaningful empirical 
results. 
This study further provides guidelines both to corporations that are intending to implement ICP as a 
risk management tool and policy makers that pursue the goal to move towards a low-carbon economy. In 
particular, the main sources of corporate environmental pollution, i.e. large and carbon-intense 
companies, are already introducing ICP schemes in anticipation of a tighter carbon constrained future. 
On the other hand, firms that are willing to implement ICP within their environmental business strategy 
might investigate the importance of a sustainability committee and utilize its experience and expertise in 
this field to design a guide on how to develop these corporate capabilities. Additionally, governments 
should incentivize the presence of a corporate sustainability committee. While more and more authorities, 
including the European Union, are requiring certain large companies to disclose information on their 
environmental impact (CDSB, 2016), they should also eventually consider mandatory presence of 
sustainability committees for firms that are highly harmful to the environment.  
Lastly, ICP emerged as a climate risk management tool only over the last few years. As soon as its 
benefits and drawbacks are more intensively explored and estimated, managers of highly leveraged 




with a special focus on their utilization to hedge financial risks in the long-term.  
 
6.3 Limitations and future research  
Although this paper provides first insights into the novel research field of ICP, its results should be viewed 
within the context of its limitations Firstly, this research is based on data extracted from the CDP surveys. 
As its answers are voluntary and self-reported by participating firms, the quality and consistency of the 
data provided need to be verified. Therefore, a counter-check with corporate reports and Bloomberg data 
has been undertaken. However, non-responding firms have been excluded from the sample which might 
lead to a self-selection bias, as explained by Luo and Tang (2016). Second, the results of the study clearly 
focus on companies with very large revenues and are therefore hard to generalize. Lastly, we could not 
sufficiently test for endogeneity due to the characteristics of our sample. One might assume that 
independent specialists are hired when company executives plan to adopt ICP or other climate change 
adaptation strategies. However, company executives reveal that environmental committees are the 
initiators of such practices most of the time (Bartlett et al., 2017).  
Currently, only data on whether a company implements ICP or not is considered as reliable and 
comparable. However, there exist large differences in the values firms assign to their emissions and, 
additionally, its coverage may vary highly among companies and sectors. Whilst some might apply their 
ICP system on all current operations and future investments, others might only target particular projects 
(Bartlett, 2017). As ICP is steadily growing as a corporate business practice, we also expect more 
sophisticated and differentiated disclosures in this field. Therefore, future studies should incorporate more 
detailed data, investigate which factors determine the value and evaluate the quality of each system. The 
use of panel data could investigate the effect of ICP adoption on environmental and financial 
performance. Finally, our empirical findings are based on completely quantitative data. We suggest that 




motivations of introducing such a carbon management tool. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Given the recent reversals of climate change policy, large and carbon-intense corporations, the main 
source of human-caused greenhouse gas emissions, are already preparing for a carbon-constrained future 
whilst ensuring long-term profitability by internalizing the costs of produced carbon emissions. The 
results provide statistical evidence of a positive effect of regulatory and to some extent societal pressure 
on ICP adoption. In contrast to the hypothesis set, however, highly leveraged firms from non-financial 
sectors are less likely to adopt such a scheme. Whilst corporate governance factors showed to be not 
statistically significant, the presence of an environmental committee proved to be a crucial factor as well. 
Additionally, the analysis revealed that large and carbon-intense companies are more likely to implement 
ICP mechanisms within their operations. Eventually, the importance of an environmental committee 
needs to be emphasized by both regulators and business experts. It could even be considered to make its 
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Country Frequency  GICS-Sector Frequency 
USA 87  Financials 60 
Japan 30  Consumer Discretionary 41 
Britain 23  Industrials 29 
France 21  Consumer Staples 26 
Germany 16  Technology 25 
China 11  Health Care 22 
South Korea 10  Energy 18 
Spain 9  Utilities 16 
Netherlands 8  Communication 12 
Australia 7  Materials 12 
Italy 6   261 
Brazil 5    
Taiwan 4    
Canada 4    
Ireland 4    
Sweden 3    
India 2    
Russia 2    
Mexico 1    
Belgium 1    
Luxembourg 1    
Denmark 1    
Finland 1    
Israel 1    
Thailand 1    
Norway 1    
Singapore 1    
























Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Testing 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
SocPress 2.37 0.42 
Democ 2.23 0.45 
FSize 1.85 0.54 
BInd 1.58 0.63 
CredPress 1.57 0.64 
RegPress 1.54 0.65 
ANS 1.49 0.67 
CarInt 1.38 0.72 
ROA 1.35 0.74 
EnvCom 1.13 0.88 
BSize 1.12 0.89 











Summarized Results of the Robustness Checks 
 




























































































Pseudo R2 0.2093 ** 0.3008 ** 
Correctly classified 78.54 %. 76.62 %. 
Notes: Average Marginal Effects reported  
N = 261 for Model 4; N = 201 for Model 5 
Model 4 employs alternative proxies for FSize, ANS and CarInt 
Model 5 excludes firms from the financial sector 






Spearman Correlations  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. ICP 1.00***           
 
2. RegPress .214*** 1.00***          
 
3. CredPress -.102*** .047*** 1.00***         
 
4. SocPress .024*** -.228*** -.043*** 1.00***        
 
5. EnvCom .188*** -.075*** -.005*** .030*** 1.00***       
 
6. BSize .045*** .233*** .259*** -.135*** .016*** 1.00***      
 
7. BInd -.068*** -.433*** .034*** .238*** .234*** -.053*** 1.00***      
 
8. CarInt .325*** .078*** -.391*** .060*** .123*** -.001*** .013*** 1.00***    
 
9. FSize .105*** -.051*** .422*** -.067*** .063*** .185*** .053*** -.359*** 1.00***   
 
10. RoA -.100*** -.186*** -.404*** .170*** .064*** -.092*** .123*** .159*** -.524*** 1.00***  
 
11. ANS -.135*** -.214*** -.156*** -.536*** -.076*** -.031*** .004*** -.034*** -.075*** .145*** 1.00*** 
 
12. Democ .091*** .275*** .029*** .392*** -.154*** .051*** .182*** .123*** -.039*** -.081*** -.278*** 1.00*** 
Note: N = 261 for all variables 
Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
 
